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Abstract: This article reviews the international evidence on the nature, sources and 
consequences of police and legal legitimacy. In brief, I find that procedural justice is the strongest 
predictor of police legitimacy in most countries, although normative judgements about fair 
process may – in some contexts – be crowded out by public concerns about police effectiveness 
and corruption, the scale of the crime problem, and the association of the police with a 
historically oppressive and underperforming state. Legitimacy tends to be linked to people’s 
willingness to cooperate with the police, with only a small number of national exceptions, and 
there is fair amount of evidence that people who say they feel a moral duty to obey the law also 
tend to report complying with the law in the past or intending to comply with the law in the 
future. The main argument is, however, that international enthusiasm for testing procedural 
justice theory is outpacing methodological rigor and theoretical clarity. On the one hand, the 
lack of attention to methodological equivalence is holding back the development of a properly 
comparative cross-national analysis. On the other hand, the literature would benefit from (a) 
greater delineation between legitimation and legitimacy, (b) stronger differentiation between 
police and legal legitimacy, and (c) more attention given to isolating the mechanisms through 
which legitimacy motivates cooperation and compliance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The law is the most powerful tool available to government for the regulation of the 
behaviour of people with diverse values and interests. Legal authorities have an array 
of coercive powers to apprehend, prosecute and punish those who break the law, 
but as anyone who works in the criminal justice system knows, policing works best 
when it is not needed. Self-regulation is the most efficient, and least costly, route to 
rule-observance. Most self-regulation is shaped by forces that lie outside the ambit 
of the criminal justice system, as Robert Reiner notes in his classic book The Politics 
of the Police (2000: xi): ‘…subtle, informal social controls, and policing processes 
embedded in other institutions, regulate most potential deviance’.   
Of course, legal authorities can – and do – play a role in encouraging people to 
self-regulate. On the one hand, coercive crime-control strategies seek to shift the 
incentive structures of autonomous rational choice actors: pro-active forms of 
policing and tough sentencing strategies hope to secure instrumental compliance, 
persuading people that the risks of criminal behaviour (particularly the certainty, 
severity and immediacy of punishment, Nagin, 2013) outweigh the benefits. On the 
other hand, consensual crime-control strategies seek to persuade people that the 
legal authorities are moral, just and entitled to be obeyed: process-based forms of 
policing hope to secure popular commitment to the law by treating people with 
fairness and dignity, making decisions in impartial and just ways, and respecting the 
limits of their own rightful authority. A key prediction of the most influential 
account of citizen-authority relations (procedural justice theory) is that people will 
comply with the law and cooperate with the legal authorities when they ascribe 
legitimacy to justice institutions (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). 
As debate continues about how best to design crime control-policy, there is a 
growing recognition among policy-makers in jurisdictions across the world that 
aggressive deterrence-based policing practices can backfire. By delegitimising legal 
authorities, they only increase the need for costly and minimally effective aggressive 
forms of crime-control (Tyler, 2003, 2004, 2011). Reflecting the increase in scholarly 
and policy interest into legitimacy and legitimation, the Annual Review of Law and 
Social Sciences has addressed the topic in both of the previous two editions. The 2016 
edition saw Trinkner & Tyler (2016) reviewing research on legitimacy, legal 
socialisation, and coercive and consensual authority-relations, while the 2017 edition 
contained a discussion of the observational flavour of the empirical evidence 
between Nagin & Telep (2017a, 2017b) and Tyler (2017).  
The current contribution adds to the debate by taking a distinctive look at the 
increasingly international nature of the research evidence. The path-breaking US-
based work of Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1997; Sunshine 
& Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b) has spread rapidly across 
the world, with studies being carried out in countries as diverse as Ghana, Finland, 
Russian Federation, the UK, Pakistan, Sweden, Japan, Israel, Australia, Turkey, 
South Africa, France, Ukraine, China and Nigeria. We have seen cross-national 
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studies of police legitimacy covering 28 African countries (Boateng, 2017), 29 Asian 
countries (Boateng & Buckner, 2017), and 27 European countries (Hough et al. 
2013). Several edited book volumes have placed trust and legitimacy within broader 
societal contexts (Tyler, 2007; Tankebe & Leibling, 2013; Meško & Tankebe, 2014; 
Persak, 2016; Oberwittler & Roché, 2017). In the most recent such volume, 
Oberwittler & Roché (2017) brought together scholars from Europe, the US, 
Australia, Nigeria, Japan, Turkey and elsewhere, to examine the role that varying 
societal contexts and cleavages play in police-citizen relations.  
This review focuses on the role that legitimacy plays in citizen-authority 
relations in diverse contexts. After sketching the broad contours of the legitimacy 
concept and the literature as a whole, it turns to the rapidly expanding body of 
research on police legitimacy. The focus is on the sources of police legitimacy and 
the extent to which legitimacy predicts people’s willingness to cooperate with law 
enforcement officials. The review then considers legal legitimacy and its 
consequences for legal compliance. The paper finishes with some thoughts on how 
to enhance our ability to develop a properly comparative cross-national literature. 
 
 
SETTING THE SCENE #1: WHAT IS (EMPIRICAL) LEGITIMACY? 
 
Political philosophers often employ legitimacy as a normatively-laden term to 
describe whether states and state institutions meet what Hinsch (2010: 41-42) calls 
‘certain substantive requirements – say, standards of justice and rationality expressed 
in a normative conception of legitimacy’. A standard Western account of the 
normative legitimacy of justice systems might, for instance, stress criteria like 
independence, transparency, consistency, respect for the rule of law, and so forth. 
On this account, for a society’s court system to be judged as legitimate in the 
normative sense of the concept, it would need to have in place effective systems of 
due process, standards of accountability, oversight over sentencing and anti-
corruption safeguards. A defining feature of the normative concept is that what 
citizens think about their state institutions is not of central concern: normative 
legitimacy turns on what outside observers think about the ethical use of political 
power. 
By contrast, social scientists often use legitimacy to describe whether – as a 
matter of fact – those that are subject to authority confer legitimacy on that authority 
(Tyler, 2006a, 2006b; Calderia & Gibson, 1995; Gibson et al. 2003; Justice & Meares, 
2014; Meares, 2017). The empirical concept concerns the normative justification of 
power in the eyes of those who have to abide by that power structure. Legitimacy is 
premised on a “fundamental accord” between rulers and ruled (Filiangeiri 1783-88, 
in Pardo 2000: 5) that is founded in shared norms and values and established via the 
‘moral performance’ (Liebling 2004) of power-holders. Applied to the police, this 
process involves acceptance (or rejection) of the implicit and explicit claims that 
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police make to be a morally appropriate institution, leading to the presence (or 
absence) of voluntary deference to authority. Unlike the normative concept, it is 
those who are subject to – and the beneficiaries of – power who decide the criteria 
for the ethical use of political power, judging the legitimacy of the police against 
societal norms of appropriate conduct (Trinkner & Tyler, 2016; Tyler & Trinkner, 
2018).  
There are at least three distinctive features of legitimacy judgements in the 
context of legal institutions. Each references the power and authority connected to 
an institution: 
 
1. right to power: citizens judge the normative justifiability of the power of a 
justice institution (based on the judgements of the overall appropriateness 
of the use of power);  
2. authority to govern: citizens internalise a duty to obey the commands, 
rules and laws connected to a justice institution that they believe is moral, 
just and appropriate; and, 
3. normative motivation: legitimacy influences behaviour via positive and 
negative duties and obligations. 
 
On this account, when citizens view legal authorities as legitimate (i.e. when they 
are seen to have the right to power and the authority to govern) they are (a) 
motivated to comply with the rules and orders that emanate from the institution, 
and (b) motivated to proactively cooperate with the goals of that institution (e.g. 
come forward to report crimes, provide information to the police, and give evidence 
in court). They feel a normatively grounded sense of duty to obey the commands of 
institutions they deem rightful because of the source not the content. Since 
legitimacy involves internalising the moral value that they should obey the police 
because they’re the police and obey the law because it’s the law, it operates as a ‘…reservoir 
of loyalty on which leaders can draw, giving them the discretionary authority they 
require to govern effectively’ (Tyler, 2006a: 26).  
 
 
SETTING THE SCENE #2: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGITIMACY 
RESEARCH 
 
Over the past decade or so the literature has expanded rapidly across the world and 
can, broadly speaking, be divided into three categories: 
 
1. Tests of procedural justice theory applied to the police using single city or 
national samples; 
2. Cross-national studies examining levels of police legitimacy across 
countries; and 
3. Assessments of the sources and consequences of legal legitimacy.  
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First, tests of procedural justice theory using single country or single city samples 
tend to dominate the literature. Figure 1 provides an overview. On the left-hand side 
is the direct and indirect contact that citizens have with authority figures. Procedural 
justice theory posits that what is central to these encounters is whether the authority 
figures treat citizens in a fair and respectful way, make neutral and unbiased 
decisions, display trustworthy motives, and allow the citizen a ‘voice’ in their 
interactions (e.g. let them tell ‘their side of the story’). Direct and indirect experiences 
then influence people’s beliefs about how legal officials tend to act, specifically 
whether police officers (for example) generally act in ways that are procedurally fair, 
distributively fair, lawful and effective in the fight against crime (views that are no 
doubt also shaped by the broader cultural and media landscape). Crucially, people 
draw on these judgements when thinking about the legitimacy of the institution that 
officers represent. Supportive evidence for PJT has accumulated impressively in the 
US over the years (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler 
& Wakslak, 2004; Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Tyler et al. 2010; Tyler et al., 2015; Tyler & 
Trinkner, forthcoming) and since this pioneering work, tests of procedural justice 
theory have been conducted in countries across the world, including Australia 
(Murphy & Cherney, 2012), Israel (Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013), UK (Huq 
et al. 2017), Ghana (2009), South Africa (Bradford et al. 2014), Pakistan (Jackson et 
al. 2014), Hong Kong (Cheng, 2015), Japan (Tsushima & Hamai, 2015), China (Sun 
et al., 2017) and Trinidad & Tobago (Kochel, 2012). Broadly speaking, this body of 
work supports the idea that there are, in any given society, certain core norms and 
values that determine how legal authorities should wield their authority, and when 
officials are seen to respect those norms and values, this generates institutional 
normativity among the general populace, and legitimacy motivates willing 
compliance and cooperation.  
 
Figure 1: An overview of PJT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Second, the last few years have also seen a small number of cross-national 
studies of police legitimacy. Drawing on data from Round 5 of the European Social 
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Survey (covering 27 countries), Hough et al. (2013) found that police legitimacy was 
highest in countries like Denmark, France, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland 
and Ireland, and lowest in countries like Estonia, Poland, Russian Federation, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus and Israel. Drawing on data from the Afrobarometer (covering 29 
African countries), Boateng (2017) found that trust in the police (treated as a 
measure of legitimacy) was highest in Senegal, Niger, Namibia, Malawi, Burundi and 
Burkina Faso, and lowest in Nigeria, Kenya, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Using a 
similar indicator, this time fielded in the World Values Survey, Boateng & Buckner 
(2017) found that confidence in the police was highest in Qatar, Uzbekistan and 
Jordan, and lowest in Pakistan, Armenia, Russia and Yemen.1  
Third, legal legitimacy has received less attention (most of the work has been 
done in the US, Australia and UK). The focus of these studies tends to be on the 
role that legal legitimacy plays in explaining variation in self-reported past offending 
behaviour and self-reported future willingness to comply with the law, typically in 
the context of so-called ‘everyday crimes’, i.e. those less serious infractions that the 
general public are (a) more likely to engage in and (b) more likely to honestly report 
in an interview situation. The main goal of this work is to assess whether legitimacy 
predicts compliance, adjusting for people’s instrumental motivations to comply 
(specifically, perceptual deterrence, i.e. their perceptions of the risk of being caught 
and punished). Some studies also adjust for people’s beliefs about the morality of 
the illegal behaviours (this helps to isolate the content-independent influence of 
legitimacy).  
Before turning to the literature on police and legal legitimacy in more detail, it 
is important to note that a defining feature of the literature is the ongoing debate 
about the nature of legitimacy (see Hawdon, 2008; Jackson et al. 2011; Bottoms & 
Tankebe, 2012: Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2013, 2014; Jackson & Gau, 2015; 
Tankebe et al., 2016; Hamm et al. 2017). Disagreement is not about what is being 
measured: there is a good deal of consensus about what legitimacy means as an 
abstract concept. Most scholars take the view that legitimacy exists when citizens (a) 
regard a legal institution as having a valid claim to exercise power and (b) feel a 
moral duty to obey the rules and commands that emanate from that institution 
(Tyler, 2006a, 2006b). The disagreement is about how it should be measured. And as 
I outline in the following pages, the lack of clarity and consistency is holding back 
the development of a properly comparative cross-national analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 Using multi-level modelling, Boateng (2017) found that the key predictors of trust in the police were 
satisfaction with democracy, urban/rural locality, employment status and age (at the individual level) and 
‘peacefulness’ and level of democracy (at the national level). Boateng & Buckner (2017) found that key 
predictors at the individual level included media exposure, fear of crime and terrorism, marriage and 
employment status, and education. At the country level, key predictors included levels of democracy, 
‘peacefulness’ and press freedom.  
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POLICE LEGITIMACY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
This section turns to the rapidly expanding and increasingly international body of 
work on police legitimacy.  To stress the problem of comparability, I organise the 
review according to the five main methodological approaches that scholars have 
taken to measuring police legitimacy:  
 
1. single indicator of trust or confidence in the police; 
2. one dimension, using either a scale of ‘duty to obey’ or a scale of 
‘institutional trust’; 
3. one dimension, combining ‘duty to obey’ and ‘institutional trust’ 
(sometimes including other constructs, such as affective bonds and 
motivational postures); 
4. two dimensions, either differentiating between ‘duty to obey’ and 
‘institutional trust’, or differentiating between ‘duty to obey’ and ‘normative 
alignment’; and 
5. four dimensions, differentiating between ‘procedural justice’, ‘distributive 
justice’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘lawfulness’. 
 
Two recent cross-national studies, one in Africa (Boateng, 2017) and the other 
in Asia (Boateng & Buckner, 2017), are good examples of the first approach. From 
a conceptual standpoint both papers define legitimacy as a normatively grounded 
sense of willingness to obey police commands, with Boateng (2017: 3) describing 
how ‘individuals defer to and obey police commands because they respect and 
accept the police institution as an authority to make decisions’ and Boateng & 
Buckner (2017: 3) noting that ‘To gain legitimacy in an empirical sense, one must 
genuinely believe that an institution has the authority to regulate his/her conduct.’ 
Yet, both use a single indicator of legitimacy (trust in the police in Africa and 
confidence in the policing in Asia) to operationalise the construct in the empirical 
work. They jettison the notion of voluntary deference to authority from the 
operational definition and they treat trust and confidence as proxies for the 
perceived right to power. 
The second approach uses an index to measure police legitimacy, using either a 
scale of voluntary deference to their authority, or a scale of institutional trust and 
confidence in the police. Research participants in Sun et al.’s (2017) Chinese single 
city study were asked whether they felt that they should obey the directives of police 
(even if they did not understand why officers gave those directives or do not agree 
with their reasons) and obey the decisions of police officers (because it is the right 
and proper thing to do). A similar approach was taken in Pryce et al.’s (2016) study 
of Ghanaian immigrants in Virginia (US) and Karakus’s (2017) Istanbul study. Other 
work has put institutional trust centre-stage. For example, in a study of police-citizen 
relations in Israel, Metcalfe et al.(2017) argued that:  
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‘If the police behave in ways that align with citizens’ expectations—
they perform their duties with the community’s best interests in mind 
and can be trusted to accomplish their responsibilities effectively—they 
are viewed as a legitimate authority. Accordingly, we view police 
legitimacy as a normative attitude based on motive-based trust and 
confidence in the police.’ 
 
Their survey of mostly residents of Jerusalem tapped into sentiments such as ‘the 
police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for the people in my 
neighbourhood’ and ‘I trust the leaders of the Israeli National Police to make 
decisions that are good for everyone.’  
The third approach combines a number of related ideas in the definition of 
legitimacy. This is best illustrated by Sunshine & Tyler’s (2003) New York City 
study, which fused together notions of institutional trust (trust in the honesty and 
lawfulness of officers), confidence and pride in the police, and obligation to obey 
the police and law into one index. Other work by Tyler (e.g. Tyler, 2006a; 47) has 
stressed allegiance and support in the operational definition, involving not only a 
positive ‘affective orientation’ towards an institution, but also a positive ‘general 
evaluation’ of how authority figures behave. A similar approach was taken in a 
randomised controlled trial of procedural justice policing (the Queensland 
Community Engagement Trial, Mazerolle et al. 2013), which combined obligation 
to obey the police and law (again including legal cynicism measures), consistency 
between participants’ own views and the law, and negative orientations toward the 
police. Indeed, populating notions of appropriateness and obligation in a single scale 
is common. A London-based study into young males from various black and 
minority ethnic groups asked respondents whether they felt a moral obligation to 
obey the police and whether they thought that the police was a normatively 
appropriate institution (Jackson et al. 2014). In a study set in Nigeria, Akinlabi (2015: 
10) combined measures of obligation, trust and ‘whether public perceives the police 
as wielding their authority against them or to their interest’ to explore police 
legitimacy in this West African state.  
The fourth approach defines legitimacy along two dimensions: one being right 
to rule judgements (e.g. institutional trust), the other being felt obligation to obey. 
Studies that have adopted a reflective approach to measurement have, almost 
without exception, found that legitimacy loads on two positively correlated 
underlying dimensions. For example, Reisig et al.’s (2007) national US study used 
exploratory factor analysis to test the dimensionality of legitimacy. They showed 
that trust in the police and obligation to obey should be treated as two separate 
constituent components of legitimacy, as did another US-based study (Wolfe et al., 
2016: 11). In South Africa, Bradford et al. (2014) differentiated between obligation 
to obey and normative alignment, i.e. the sense in which authority figures act in ways 
aligned with established, shared, normative and ethical frameworks, and the same 
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approach has been taken in a national survey of Japanese citizens (Tsushima & 
Hamai, 2015), a survey of citizens of Lahore, Pakistan (Jackson et al. 2014), a US 
study (Hamm et al. 2017), two UK-based studies (Jackson et al. 2012a, 2012b), and 
Round 5 of the European Social Survey (Hough et al. 2013).  
 The fifth (and final) approach to measuring police legitimacy drops the notion 
of willing deference to authority from the concept and breaks down right to power 
judgements into the four dimensions of procedural justice, distributive justice, 
lawfulness and effectiveness (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe 
et al. 2015). This approach assumes that procedural justice, distributive justice, 
effectiveness and lawfulness are the four key societal values that dictate how 
authorities should behave in a given social, political and legal context (if they are to 
be seen as legitimate). If one buys this account in a given context, then (a) there is 
no need to make it an empirical question whether this is, in fact, true or not, and (b) 
one can skip measuring some kind of overarching right to rule legitimacy (because, 
one assumes, assessments of the trustworthiness of the police to be procedurally 
fair, distributively fair, effective and lawful entirely capture the content of 
normativity). Tankebe and colleagues also argue that people can feel an obligation 
to obey the police for reasons other than legitimacy, so we should not include a 
normatively grounded sense of civic duty to obey within the legitimacy concept. 
People could respond positively to standard legitimacy indicators, not because they 
feel some kind of normatively grounded moral duty to obey, but because they feel 
a prudential and/or instrumental form of obligation. Indeed, it may even be possible 
that citizens who experience their relationship to the police as a ‘power relationship, 
pure and simple, with no element of right’ (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 126) could 
report something that we, as researchers, wrongly interpret as legitimacy.  
 
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE LITERATURE ON LEVELS OF POLICE 
LEGITIMACY ACORSS THE WORLD  
 
Let us turn to the task of developing a cross-national literature. Imagine, for one 
moment, that you are interested in documenting national levels of police legitimacy 
in countries across the world – the literature certainly spans a good deal of contexts, 
and a good place to start would be the cross-national work set in Africa (Boateng, 
2017), Asia (Boateng & Buckner, 2017) and Europe (Kaariainen, 2007; Hough et al. 
2013). But while reading this work, you might be struck by how difficult it is to 
properly compare studies. Only a single measure of trust (in the 28 African 
countries) or confidence (in the 29 Asian countries) was used. The European Social 
Survey routinely fields a similar question to its respondent (see Kaariainen’s (2007) 
analysis of differences in levels of trust in the police across 16 European countries). 
You could pool the data from these three surveys and paint a country-level picture 
across Asia, Africa and Europe, since pretty much the same measure was used.  
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But you might, on reflection, find this a little unsatisfying. Why does Kaariainen 
(2007) call this trust in the police while Boateng (2017) calls this police legitimacy?  
The criminological literature is full of single city or country studies that use survey 
indicators like ‘how confident are you in the police?’ or ‘how much do you trust the 
police,’ and scholars variously treat these as measures of ‘confidence in policing’ (in 
Belgium, Van Craen, 2003; in China, Sun et al., 2013; and in Australia, Zahnow et 
al. 2017), ‘trust in the police’ (in Belgium, Van Craen & Skogan, 2015; and in 
Hungary, Boda & Medve-Balint, 2017) or ‘police legitimacy’ (in Turkey, Karakus, 
2017; and in Nigeria, Akinlabi, 2017). Should we include all these studies when 
reviewing the legitimacy literature, even though the researchers involved do not 
seem to agree on what they are measuring? Moreover, the other major cross-national 
assessment is Round 5 of the European Social Survey, which fielded multiple 
indicators of duty to obey and normative alignment with the police (Jackson, et al. 
2011). Should those data points be included? If so, how?  
 
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE CROSS-NATIONAL LITERATURE ON THE 
ANTECEDENTS OF POLICE LEGITIMACY  
 
In addition, imagine that you want to examine whether the sources of police 
legitimacy vary from one context to the next. Do the normative criteria of legitimacy 
that people apply to the police depend to some degree on context? It seems, looking 
across the available evidence, that process matters most when police power is 
exercised (Kochel et al. 2013; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013; Hough et al. 
2013a, 2013b; Cheng, 2015, 2016; Murphy et al. 2016; Sun et al. 2017; Brouwer et 
al. 2017). The majority of studies in the US, Australia, UK, continental Europe, Israel 
and further afield have showed that when citizens believe that officers generally act 
in procedurally fair ways they also tend to view the institution as morally valid 
(whether measured via trust/confidence or normative alignment) and to voluntarily 
defer to the authority that legitimacy lends officers. Assessments of the effectiveness 
of the police or whether police allocate outcomes (such as arrests, citations, 
protection and service) fairly are typically much less important predictors of 
legitimacy. On this account, what underpins the normative justification of police 
power most keenly is the importance of treating those they protect and regulate with 
dignity and respect, behaving in neutral, unbiased ways, showing trustworthy 
motives and a willingness to help citizens, and allowing citizens voice and agency in 
interactions (Trinkner & Tyler, 2016; Trinkner et al. 2017).  
It is, however, difficult to make precise comparisons across multiple 
jurisdictions because some studies treat legitimacy as trust, different studies take 
different approaches to defining and measuring procedural justice (some studies 
even include trustworthy motives in the procedural justice concept), and not all 
studies include a relatively complete set of assessments of how officers behave. 
However, a handful of studies set in the US, UK, South Africa, Japan and across the 
European Union have (a) defined and measured legitimacy in the same way, (b) 
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included the same set of assessments of how officers behave, and (c) defined and 
measured these legitimacy judgements in the same way. All these studies specified 
legitimacy along two dimensions (normative alignment and duty to obey) and in 
both the UK and the US, procedural justice was a stronger predictor of both aspects 
of police legitimacy than effectiveness (Jackson et al. 2012a; Tyler & Jackson, 2014). 
Looking across Europe, the same pattern held in most of the countries (Hough et 
al. 2013). Procedural justice was a stronger predictor of both normative alignment 
and duty to obey, compared to effectiveness and distributive justice.  
The story in Japan is a little different, however. While procedural justice was a 
stronger predictor of normative alignment than effectiveness, for duty to obey it was 
effectiveness that was more important (Tsushima & Hamai, 2015). What about 
countries that have (a) high levels of crime and (b) legal institutions that have not 
yet shown their ability to secure a bare-minimum ability to provide security to 
citizens and be free from corruption? Thus far, in such contexts, the evidence points 
towards the idea that that police effectiveness is a stronger predictor of legitimacy 
than procedural justice. In South African work, Bradford et al. (2014) argued that 
normative judgements about fair process may, to some degree, be crowded out by 
concerns about police effectiveness and corruption, the sheer scale of the crime 
problem and the association of the police with a historically oppressive and 
underperforming state. Work in Ghana (Tankebe, 2009) and Pakistan (Jackson et al. 
2014) supports this notion.  
It is important that the literature expands the country focus, pays more 
attention to methodological equivalence, and avoids conflating the antecedents of 
legitimacy with legitimacy itself, particularly concerning the right to rule part of the 
concept (Gau, 2011; Reisig et al. 2007; White et al. 2015). For example, some 
measures of trust and confidence (treated as legitimacy) come a little close to the 
motive-based trust component of procedural justice, e.g. ‘the police care about the 
well-being of everyone they deal with’ (Tyler & Fagan, 2008). In a study of the 
attitudes and experiences of terrorism-related policing among London-based 
Muslims (Huq et al. 2011), one of the measures of legitimacy was ‘you trust the 
police to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and 
prosecuting terrorism’ and three of the measures of procedural justice referred to 
‘applying the law consistently to everyone’, ‘taking into account the needs and 
concerns of the people they deal with’ and ‘considering people’s views when 
deciding what to do.’ When the measures of different concepts overlap, this risks 
artificially inflating the observed correlation.  
Consider the approach of Tankebe and colleagues. Legitimacy is measured 
along four dimensions – procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and 
lawfulness – but according to procedural justice theory, it is an empirical question 
whether, when forming legitimacy judgements, citizens focus most keenly on the 
procedural fairness of officers, the distributive fairness of officers, the effectiveness 
of officers and so forth. The approach of Tankebe and colleagues assumes — by 
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definition — that citizens judge the legitimacy on the basis of the procedural and 
distributive justice of officer behaviour, whether officers act lawfully, and whether 
they are effective in dealing with crime. If one used this approach in cross-national 
research, it would not be an empirical question whether people assess police 
legitimacy in different ways in different societal settings; the researcher a priori 
assumes the normative preconditions of legitimacy in a given context. If the focus 
is cross-national, then the researcher is, by definition, assuming that the normative 
preconditions of legitimacy are exactly the same in different social, political and legal 
contexts. 
 
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE CROSS-NATIONAL LITERATURE ON THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF POLICE LEGITIMACY  
 
What about the consequences of police legitimacy? It is fair to say that the literature 
has focused on people’s willingness to cooperate with the police, without too much 
emphasis placed on isolating exactly the psychological mechanism(s) at play. In 
Cherney & Murphy’s (2013) investigation into the views and experiences of Arabic-
speaking people in Australia, trust in the police was a key predictor of willingness to 
help the police in both general crime control and specific counter-terrorism 
activities. This suggests that these research participants were more willing to 
proactively help the efforts of the police when they believed that the police have the 
right intentions and can be trusted to act in ways that take into account the views 
and interests of the local community. It does, indeed, seem plausible that shared 
interests and social bonds partly drive public cooperation with the police.  
What about the motivational role of voluntary deference to police authority? 
Drawing on data from a sample of adolescents in Jamaica, Reisig & Lloyd (2008) 
found that obligation was not a significant predictor of willingness to cooperate with 
the police. Kochel et al.’s (2013) Trinidad & Tobago-set study also found obligation 
to be a weak (and not statistically significant) predictor of people’s willingness to 
report a crime to the police. Intriguingly, the fact that procedural justice was more 
important than obligation suggests that people may be more willing to come forward 
with information to the police when they trust that officers will treat them with 
respect and dignity and make fair and just decisions. Indeed, it is not entirely clear 
why duty to obey would motivate proactive cooperation. In the context of 
compliance with the police, the mechanism would be more obvious; people 
internalise the overarching moral value that it is the right and proper thing to defer 
to the decisions and orders of officers. Deference shapes reactive behaviour. Why 
would duty to obey encourage more proactive behaviours like going out of one’s 
way to report a crime and give information to the police?  
Most studies into legitimacy-cooperation relations treat legitimacy as a 
combination of appropriateness and obligation. For example, Sunshine & Tyler 
(2003) found that people tended to report being willing to cooperate when they 
viewed the police as a morally valid institution that is entitled to be obeyed (no 
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matter their ethnic group). The same was found in Tyler & Fagan’s (2008) 
longitudinal study that was set in the same city. White et al. (2015) interviewed 
individuals who had been arrested for a variety of different crimes in Arizona, 
showing that people who felt a normatively-grounded sense of support of – and 
deference towards – the police tended to report being willing to report a crime to 
the police (for instance). This generalised across offender type, e.g. violent, property 
or drug crime. In Mazerolle et al.’s (2013) RCT of process-based policing in 
Queensland, Australia, legitimacy (similarly defined) was a strong predictor of 
willingness to cooperate with the police, and in Murphy’s (2013) work, also set in 
Australia, legitimacy was a stronger predictor of willingness to report a crime to the 
police among young people compared to adults. 
However, Huq et al.’s (2011) study of Muslims living in London found no 
relationship between legitimacy and cooperation. A feature of this work was its focus 
on police investigation and prosecution of terrorism, with legitimacy measured using 
standard duty to obey indicators, plus two items about the appropriateness of police 
behaviour regarding the policing of terrorism in their own community. And 
willingness to cooperate with the police addressing, among other things, 
encouraging members of their own community to help the police fight terrorism 
and reporting to the police a person distributing material expressing support for al 
Qaeda. A central finding of their study was that fairness of policy formation (i.e. 
where government involved the community in the design of policy) and the 
procedural fairness of the officers’ implementation policy were key predictors of 
willingness to cooperate, but legitimacy was not. Of the predictors of legitimacy 
judgements, people who felt that police unfairly targeted their community tended to 
see the police as less legitimate, compared to those who felt that police were not so 
intrusive. The national study of Japanese citizens mentioned earlier in this review 
also found that legitimacy was unrelated to cooperation (Tsushima and Hamai, 
2015). Neither duty to obey nor normative alignment with the police predicted 
general willingness to report a crime and give information to officers. Interestingly, 
there was little variation in people’s willingness to cooperate; most research 
participants expressed a strong willingness. The two authors offer a number of 
fascinating potential explanations, including the notion that legal citizenship and 
duty to obey do not translate so neatly into Japanese society, and the idea that Japan’s 
low crime levels are less to do with the police, and more to do with the strong, 
culturally bound sources of order, informal sanctioning and surveillance that lie 
outside the ambit of the criminal justice system. 
When studies have differentiated between trust in the police and obligation to 
obey, they have tended to find that trust is a more important predictor of 
cooperation than obligation (e.g. Reisig et al., 2007 and Dirikx and van Den Bulck, 
2014), and when studies have differentiated between normative alignment and 
obligation to obey, they have tended to find that normative alignment is more 
important than obligation (e.g. Jackson et al., 2012b). Of particular note are three 
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pieces of work. Tyler & Jackson’s (2014) US-based study pitted different elements 
of legitimacy against each other, with all three predicting cooperation (normative 
alignment was a stronger predictor than trust, and trust was a stronger predictor 
than obligation). Van Damme et al.’s (2013) Swedish based study placed concepts 
in a particular order, where trust in police procedural fairness predicted normative 
alignment, normative alignment predicted obligation to obey, and obligation to obey 
predicted willingness to cooperate with the police. Hamm et al. (2017) found that 
normative alignment was a more important predictor of willingness to cooperate 
than obligation to obey, with the willingness to be vulnerable also significant 
(captured using measures like ‘I am generally comfortable being vulnerable to the 
judgement of the police in my community’ and ‘I would be comfortable letting the 
police in my community handle a specific situation that was important to me’).  
In summary, one facet of the legitimacy concept tends to be more strongly 
related to cooperation than the other facet (obligation to obey). People who trust 
the police and/or feel normatively aligned with the police tend to report a greater 
willingness to go out of their way to help the police fight crime, compared to people 
who feel an obligation to obey the police. There is also an emerging line of research 
that links police legitimacy to public attitudes towards violence, whether it be police 
use of violence or citizen use of violence to achieve certain social and political goals 
(Jackson et al. 2013; Bradford et al. 2017; Gerber & Jackson, 2017). But it is difficult 
to properly compile a comparative body of evidence because, as a whole, studies 
lack comparability. We need a concerted commitment to methodological 
equivalence going forward. 
 
 
LEGAL LEGITIMACY 
 
Turning now to the legitimacy of the law, (i) what does legal legitimacy and 
normatively-grounded law-abidingness means in people’s everyday lives? And (ii) 
what is the evidence linking legal legitimacy to legal compliance (for discussion 
about causality see Nagin & Telep, 2017a, 2017b, and Tyler, 2017)? From a 
conceptual standpoint, legal legitimacy tends to be defined as an active and willing 
acceptance of the right of the law to dictate appropriate behaviour. Just like police 
legitimacy, this form of voluntary deference to authority is assumed to be grounded 
in the recognition of the normativity of the justice system more broadly. There are 
three main approaches to measuring legal legitimacy:  
 
1. combining legal legitimacy with police legitimacy in various different forms; 
2. one dimension, using a scale of ‘legal cynicism’, ‘obligation to obey’ or 
‘normative alignment’; and 
3. two dimensions: ‘obligation to obey’ and ‘normative alignment’. 
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An example of the first approach is Tyler et al.’s (2015) US-based study, in which 
a single composite index brought together normative alignment with the law (e.g. 
‘the law does not protect your interests’), normative alignment with the police (e.g. 
‘the police usually act in ways consistent with your own ideas about what is right 
and wrong’), obligation to obey the law (e.g. ‘all laws should be strictly obeyed’) and 
obligation to obey the police (e.g. ‘the police in your community are legitimate 
authorities so you should do what they tell you to do’). Other studies have taken a 
similar approach. As with police legitimacy, this is a trend that can be traced back 
to Tyler’s (1990) foundational book Why People Obey the Law. For instance, Penner 
et al.’s (2014) longitudinal study of just under 100 young people on probation in 
British Columbia (Canada) combined measures of obligation to obey the law with 
measures of support for the police and courts. 
Another classic study, this time of legal cynicism (an example of the second 
approach), is Sampson & Bartusch’s (1998) Chicago-based work. To capture ‘the 
sense in which laws or rules are not considered binding in the existential, present 
lives of respondents’, measures like ‘laws were made to be broken’ aimed to assess 
the ‘ratification of acting in ways that are “outside” of law and social norms (p. 786). 
Kirk & Papachristos (2011: 1197) broadened out the concept, defining legal 
cynicism as a ‘frame through which individuals interpret the functioning and 
viability of the law and its agents, especially law enforcement’. To tap into the 
sentiment that the law is just, legitimate and responsive, they combined the ‘laws are 
made to be broken’ survey indicator with two judgements of police effectiveness 
(‘the police are not doing a good job in preventing crime in the neighbourhood’ and 
‘the police are not able to maintain order on the streets and sidewalks in the 
neighbourhood’). Another approach to measuring legal cynicism stresses the belief 
that legal norms are unjust, drawing on the idea that legal cynicism arises through 
what Nivette et al. (2015: 4) call  
 
‘…individual and collective experiences of disadvantage and injustice. As bonds 
to social institutions weaken, legal norms lose their “bindingness” and this may 
be replaced by attitudes that justify contempt of legal rules, the self-centred 
pursuit of one’s goals, and distrust in the police.’  
 
Papachristos et al. (2012) used a similar index that included measures like ‘people 
should obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right’ with measures 
like ‘the law represents the values of the people in power, rather than the values of 
people like me’. In an Australian study, Murphy et al. (1997) used measures like ‘the 
laws that the police enforce are consistent with the views of Australians’ to capture 
normative alignment with the law.  
An example of the third approach is Trinkner et al.’s (forthcoming) US-based 
study, which defined legal legitimacy along two dimensions. Normative alignment 
was operationalised as the extent to which people felt that the laws that the police 
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generally enforce in their communities aligned with their own moral values and that 
the enforcement of those laws helped maintain order and cooperation in their 
community. Example measures are ‘your own feelings about what is right and wrong 
usually agree with the laws by the police and the courts’ and ‘obeying the law 
ultimately benefits everyone in the community’. Duty to obey was defined and 
measured in the normal way, using for instance measures like ‘sometimes doing the 
right thing means breaking the law.’ 
Before turning to the empirical evidence on the link between legitimacy and 
compliance, it is important to position legitimacy within Bottoms’s (2002) four 
categories for the explanation of compliance with authority in general, and with the 
criminal law in particular: 
 
1. prudential or self-interested calculations about the potential costs and 
benefits of breaking the law, taking into account the risks and costs of 
punishment;  
2. the impact of obstructive strategies, such as locking up offenders to prevent 
their reoffending, and locking up the targets of criminal attention, literally 
or metaphorically;  
3. normative considerations about the ‘rights and wrongs’ of non-compliance; 
and  
4. habit. 
 
These categories help us be clear about the difference between obeying the law 
and acting consistently with the law (Schauer, 2015). Acting consistently with the law 
means conforming with the law for reasons independent of the law, i.e. “…engaging 
in the same behaviour we would have engaged in even if no laws regulating it 
existed” (Schauer, 2015: 6). By contrast, legitimacy forms part of people’s normative 
considerations about the ‘rights and wrongs’ of non-compliance, stepping in when 
moral values, social norms and habit in some sense ‘fail.’ Legitimacy provides a 
motive to obey the law rather than a motive to act consistently with the law. 
Legitimacy means treating an order or rule as ‘superseding and replacing one’s own 
judgement’ (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012: 135), whereby people internalise a general 
moral obligation to obey the law because it’s the law. Crucially, this is assumed to be 
through the associate obligations, positional duties and affective bonds that 
legitimate power structures generate and maintain. 
 
DOES THE LEGITIMACY OF THE LAW PREDICT COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE LAW?  
 
To empirically isolate the content-independent motivational force of legal 
legitimacy, criminological studies tend to adjust for key predictors of legal 
compliance and offending behaviour. In Tyler’s (1990) seminal Chicago-based 
study, for instance, legitimacy (combining felt obligation to obey the law and 
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support for the police and courts) was a statistically significant predictor of legal 
compliance, adjusting for perceptions of the risk of getting caught, the likelihood of 
peer disapproval, and the morality of the various crimes they were being asked 
about. The focus was on various low-level crimes like driving while intoxicated, 
shoplifting inexpensive items, and disturbing neighbours with noise. The empirical 
link between legitimacy and compliance held in both an analysis of data from the 
first of two waves of the panel study, and an analysis of data from both waves (using 
legitimacy at time-point one to predict legal compliance at time-point two). The 
same type of low-level crimes was addressed in Sunshine & Tyler’s (2003) New York 
City study. Legitimacy was again a significant predictor of compliance, this time 
adjusting for perceived risk of getting caught and perceptions of police fairness and 
performance.  
A more recent US study differentiated between minor crimes (e.g. breaking 
traffic laws) and major crimes (e.g. buying stolen goods), and treated legitimacy as a 
three-dimensional construct — obligation, trust and confidence, and normative 
alignment (Tyler & Jackson, 2014). Of these three different facets, obligation was 
the most important predictor of minor and major compliance, adjusting for the 
perceived risk of getting caught. Reisig et al. (2007) similarly treated legitimacy as a 
multi-dimensional construct (distinguishing between trust in the police and 
obligation to obey the police and law) but this time it was trust in the police that 
was a significant predictor of everyday legal compliance, not obligation to obey. 
Interestingly, both studies used a national sample of US citizens. 
Moving across the Atlantic, a nationally representative sample survey of 
England and Wales found that felt moral duty to obey the law predicted legal 
compliance, adjusting for the perceived risk of getting caught, the immorality of the 
criminal acts, obligation to obey the police, and normative alignment with the police 
(Jackson et al., 2012b). Again, the focus was on low-level crimes — i.e. the type of 
activities that could plausibly be carried out by ‘those who think of themselves as 
respectable citizens, and who would definitely reject the labels of “criminals” and 
“crime” for themselves and their action’ (Karstedt and Farrall 2006: 1011). 
Legitimacy was linked back to positive and negative encounters with police officers, 
and the argument made was that procedural justice strengthens the sense that police 
respect the societal norms that determine how they should behave towards citizens, 
which in turn strengthens one’s commitment to the societal norms dictating how 
citizens should behave in relation to the law. 
Some studies have addressed the link between legitimacy and compliance 
among known offender populations. An Australian panel study into tax fraud 
showed a link between legitimacy and offending behaviour, adjusting for perceived 
risk and personal morality (Murphy et al., 2016). A study of “active offenders” as 
part of the Chicago Gun Project found that individuals with social networks that 
were saturated with gang members tended to have more negative views towards the 
law and legal authorities, and that legitimacy was a significant negative predictor of 
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carrying a gun (but not of fighting), adjusting for an index of deterrence 
(Papachristos et al., 2012). Also focusing on known offenders, researchers have 
drawn upon data in the Pathways to Desistance Study set in Pennsylvania and 
Arizona. Augustyn (2015) used a scale of 22 illegal activities, some of which are 
relatively serious (e.g. taking something from someone by force with a weapon and 
breaking into a building to steal something), finding that legal cynicism was a 
significant predictor of legal compliance among individuals who had been arrested 
when they were thirteen years of age or older. Notably, Augustyn adjusted for an 
unusually comprehensive range of factors, including trust in the police, perceptions 
of procedural justice among police and judges, criminal history, personal rewards of 
crime, punishment costs, and perceived certainty of punishment. Kaiser & Reisig 
(2017) fitted a series of multi-level longitudinal count models to the same source of 
data, finding that legal cynicism predicted changing levels of criminal offending, 
while the legitimacy of the police and courts (specifically, support for the police and 
courts) explained between-individual variation.  
Penner et al.’s (2014) longitudinal study of youth on probation in British 
Columbia, Canada, found that prior experience of procedural justice within the 
juvenile justice system predicted both self-reported offending and official offending 
records, but only when that experience was within the past three months. In other 
words, the effect seemed to wane. Legitimacy – obligation to obey the law and 
support for the police and courts – did not mediate this effect, however, nor was it 
associated with offending behaviour. Cavanagh & Cauffman (2015) focused on 
first-time male offenders aged 13-17 in California, Louisiana and Pennsylvania, 
drawing on data from the Crossroads longitudinal study. The novel contribution 
was to consider the legitimacy judgements of both the mother and the son. The 
young people included in the study had just experienced their first encounter with 
the criminal justice system, and their legitimacy judgements predicted self-reported 
and officially recorded offending. Moreover, mothers’ legitimacy judgements 
predicted sons’ legitimacy judgements, suggesting not only intergenerational attitude 
transmission, but also a potential influencing effect.  
Nivette et al. (2015) called upon data from a prospective longitudinal study of 
a cohort of children in various primary schools in Zurich, Switzerland. Focusing on 
the waves in which children were 13 and 15, the goal was to examine the factors 
that predict legal cynicism. Of the various constructs included in the model — such 
as bonds to social institutions (commitment to school, feelings of alienation from 
society, and parental involvement in their lives), generalised trust, self-control, 
negative experiences with legal authorities, and the morality of rule transgressions 
— they found that involvement in delinquent activities was the strongest predictor. 
The authors suggest a possible neutralisation function: namely that ‘adolescents may 
adopt legal cynicism as a technique to justify wrongdoing.’  
One of the few studies linking legitimacy to legal compliance outside of North 
America, Australia and Europe is that of Lui & Lui (2017). Drawing on data from a 
convenience sample of high school students in Guangzhou, China, these authors 
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examined the factors linked to a broad range of offending behaviour, including 
vandalism, shoplifting, burglary, weapon carrying, drug dealing, and animal abuse. 
Details are a little hazy, but the mean of the compliance index was 0.83, suggesting 
that 83% of the sample said that they had not committed any of the crimes. The 
authors found that police distributive fairness and support for the police were 
significant predictors of compliance; felt obligation to obey the police was not an 
important predictor; and legal legitimacy was not addressed in the study.  
Finally, Trinkner et al. (2017) found that duty to obey was a significant negative 
predictor of past criminal behaviour (e.g. buying something that might be stolen, 
taking something from a store without paying for it, and illegally disposing of 
rubbish or litter), adjusting for normative alignment with the law (as well as the 
judgements about the risk of sanction and the morality of buying stolen goods, 
shoplifting, and dumping rubbish and so forth). Normative alignment with the law 
was defined as the belief that the laws that are generally enforced in one’s 
community align with one’s sense of right and wrong and that members of one’s 
community should obey the law to help maintain a mutually beneficial scheme of 
social cooperation. The argument is that duty to obey may play a content-
independent role in explaining variation in compliance with the law.  
 
 
CLOSING REMARKS 
 
In this review, I have argued that the remarkable burst of international enthusiasm 
for examining the nature and significance of the legitimacy of legal authorities has 
outpaced attention to equivalence, rigour of measurement and theoretical ambition. 
Legitimacy has been measured in a variety of different ways, and the overarching 
lack of measurement equivalence means that it is difficult to properly compare 
studies. Some scholars have treated legitimacy as a uni-dimensional construct, others 
as a multi-dimensional construct. Some scholars have differentiated between the 
police, courts and law, others have bundled them together. There has been a 
connected failure to develop a comparable body of cross-national research that 
places legitimacy within its broader theoretical context. In particular, the fuzziness 
of the operational definitions has hindered our ability to understand the content of 
legitimation and the influence of legitimacy. Some approaches have conflated 
legitimation with legitimacy, and it is often not clear why legitimacy motivates 
cooperation and compliance (if indeed it does) in a particular context. For a formal, 
comparative cross-national body of evidence to develop, we need some kind of 
agreed basis on which to define and measure concepts in comparable (but locally 
appropriate) ways in different national settings. We also need to model legitimacy 
within a comparably ambitious framework that maximises definitional clarity and 
analytical power. Only then can this exciting and rapidly expanding body of 
international research reach its full potential. 
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By way of contribution, I close with what I think are some of the more 
promising ways forward. Starting with police legitimacy, it is important to consider 
both right to rule judgements (the normative appropriateness of an institution) and 
obligation to obey (the right of a legal authority to dictate appropriate behaviour). 
Right to rule judgements should be overarching (they should not assume the value 
content of legitimation, i.e. the criteria that citizens apply when judging the 
legitimacy of a particular institution) and obligation to obey measures should be 
phrased in ways that clearly reference a sense of truly free consent towards a 
normatively appropriate institution. Given the occasional tendency of institutional 
trust measures to overlap in content with procedural justice, and given the lack of 
clarity regarding (a) how it motivates and (b) whether the motivational force chimes 
with standard definitions of the legitimacy concept, I would recommend 
approaching it through the lens of normative alignment. Standard measures of 
normative alignment, fielded across Europe and in the US, South Africa and Japan, 
tap into an overarching sense of appropriateness. A key part of normative alignment 
is that the belief that the police act in ways that align with societal standards 
strengthens the corresponding belief among citizens that they, too, should act 
appropriately – if they act properly, I’ll act properly. The study of Hamm et al. (2017) is 
illustrative because they measured people’s willingness to be vulnerable (part of the 
trust concept) and found that normative alignment predicted willingness to 
cooperate, adjusting for willingness to be vulnerable, and studies like this, which 
hone in on the motivational character of police legitimacy, are to be welcomed, as 
are studies that broaden out the range of potential predicates of police legitimacy. 
For instance, Huq et al. (2017) found that procedural justice and bounded authority 
(respecting the limits of one’s rightful authority) predicted police legitimacy, but 
distributive justice and perceptions of surveillance activities did not (effectiveness 
predicted duty to obey but not normative alignment).  
For legal legitimacy, one important thing to clarify in future research is the 
definition, specifically whether normative alignment and obligation to obey 
comprise one or two dimensions of the construct. This would, among other things, 
help isolate the mechanisms at play in the link between legal legitimacy and legal 
compliance (assuming there is robust dependence between these two factors in a 
given social, political and legal context). What, in addition, are the key predictors of 
legal legitimacy? Trinkner et al. (forthcoming) found that a good deal of variation in 
normative alignment with the law was explained by police legitimacy and 
assessments of officer behaviour, but much less variation in obligation to obey the 
law was explained by the same factors. We need more work on this issue. It is also 
important to use innovative measures to address the issue of social desirability. 
Randomised response techniques (like the item count technique, see Kuha & 
Jackson, 2014) may help improve the reliability of self-reported offending measures. 
Finally, studies should endeavour to measure other motivations to act consistency 
with the law and obey the law – most obviously, personal moral, social norms (e.g. 
disapproval of others) and perceptual deterrence. We can explore the role that 
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legitimacy plays – for instance, obligation to obey may strengthen people’s 
willingness to obey the law while normative alignment may strengthen people’s 
willingness to act in ways that are consistent with the law.  
Finally, a constant theme throughout this review is the role that methodological 
equivalence plays in building up a robust body of comparable evidence. Needless to 
say, studies in countries across the world should gravitate towards some common 
method – only then can we start to properly build up a powerful comparative 
analysis of police-citizen authority relations across the world.  
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